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COMMERCIAL LAW
American Coleman Co. v. Intrawest Bank of Southglenn, 887 F.2d 1382
Author: Judge Barrett
Plaintiff, American Coleman Company ("Coleman"), brought this
action for damages after defendant, Intrawest Bank of Southglenn
("Bank"), refused to honor a request for payment pursuant to a letter of
credit. The Bank alleged that the request was not in strict compliance
with the letter of credit. Coleman argued that the request was in strict
compliance even though it contained an error. Coleman further asserted
that the Bank should be estopped from raising the strict compliance is-
sue because it was not raised at the time of the request. Applying the
strict compliance standard, the district court granted the Bank's motion
for summary judgment. Coleman appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that Colorado law requires literal and tech-
nical adherence to the requirements of letters of credit and thus the dis-
trict court did not err in applying the strict compliance standard. The
court further held that the waiver-estoppel rule is limited to situations
where the statements have misled the beneficiary who would have cured
the defect but relied on the stated grounds to its injury. Here, due to
time constraints, Coleman could not have cured the error in its request
even had it been advised of the grounds.
Doyle v. Trinity Savings and Loan Association, 869 F.2d 558
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Doyle, executed an adjustable rate promissory note, se-
cured by a real estate mortgage, in favor of defendant, Trinity Savings
and Loan Association ("Trinity"). Trinity placed the incorrect interest
rate on the note, later corrected the mistake, and placed Doyle's initials
by the corrections. Trinity then sold the note to Federal National Mort-
gage Association ("FNMA"), who purchased in good faith. Doyle
brought suit against Trinity and FNMA claiming the alterations were
made without his knowledge or consent, and that his initials were
forged. Doyle was awarded actual and punitive damages against Trinity,
and the district court cancelled the note and mortgage against FNMA.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision, finding that Trinity over-
reached in a bad faith effort to gain an unfair advantage. The court fur-
ther held that the alterations were material because they changed the
legal rights and liabilities of the parties. Moreover, Trinity was liable for
its employee's acts even though Trinity did not authorize its employee
to make the alterations.
The court also held that FNMA could not enforce the note because
it was not a holder in due course. FNMA could not obtain this status
because the note did not contain a promise to pay a sum certain. In-
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stead, the note contained an adjustable interest rate tied to an external
index, causing it to be non-negotiable. As a result, FNMA was not a
holder in due course.
United States v. Kelley, 890 F.2d 220
Author: Judge Logan
Defendants appealed the grant of summary judgment by the district
court in favor of the Small Business Administration in a deficiency judg-
ment claim brought against the defendants. Defendants, having joined
Fairlawn Plaza State Bank ("Bank") as a third-party defendant, claimed
the liquidation sale by the Bank was conducted in a commercially unrea-
sonable manner in violation of the Kansas Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC").
The Tenth Circuit considered whether the defendants, as guaran-
tors, could raise the UCC defense of a commercially unreasonable sale,
and, if so, whether they could and did waive the defense. Holding that
the state's interpretation of its UCC provisions should control, the court
concluded that the Kansas Supreme Court would hold that guarantors,
such as the defendants, are to be treated as debtors under the Kansas
UCC. As such, they would not be permitted to waive the commercially
unreasonable defense. The court therefore reversed and remanded for
further proceedings.
Mainland Savings Association v. Riverfront Associates, 872 F.2d 955
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Mainland Savings Association ("Mainland"), brought suit
against the defendants, Riverfront Associates and its guarantors ("River-
front"), for default on a promissory note executed by defendants. River-
front claimed an offset for failure on the part of Mainland to fund a
second loan. The Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation
("FSLIC") intervened as receiver for Mainland.
The Tenth Circuit found that the promise to fund the second loan
was not part of the note or security agreements. The court held that
there are limited defenses which can be asserted against federal authori-
ties who are seeking to collect the assets of insolvent financial institu-
tions. The court affirmed the district court's granting of summary
judgment in favor of the FSLIC.
MSA Tubular Products v. First Bank and Trust Co., 869 F.2d 1422
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, MSA Tubular Products ("MSA"), filed this action claiming
defendant, First Bank and Trust Company ("Bank"), was liable to MSA
for payment of a $104,000judgment recovered against Oil West, one of
the Bank's depositors. Although the district court found that the Bank
gave misleading information regarding Oil West's credit worthiness, it
held for the Bank, ruling that the Bank did not have a fiduciary relation-
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ship with MSA absent a specific request for a written credit report and
thus owed no fiduciary duty to disclose information concerning Oil
West's account.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Oklahoma
law would be construed to hold that when the Bank undertook to re-
spond to MSA's inquiry, the Bank assumed the duty to respond accu-
rately and could be held liable for giving misleading information if MSA
reasonably relied upon the statement of the bank employee.
Title Insurance Co. v. American Savings and Loan Association, 866 F.2d
1284
Per Curiam
The predecessor of defendant, American Savings and Loan Associa-
tion ("American"), made loans on condominiums secured by deeds of
trust. These deeds were insured by insurance policies purchased from
plaintiff, Title Insurance Company ("Title"). American foredosed on
the properties and a subsidiary eventually brought suit to recover defi-
ciencyjudgments from the borrowers. The borrowers filed a third-party
complaint against American claiming the loans were invalid under the
applicable "doing business" law, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-43-101. Ameri-
can, relying on the policies, argued Title must defend and indemnify.
Title argued it need not defend because American did not comply with
the "doing business" law. The district court denied Tide's motion for
summary judgment stating that the statute was not a "doing business"
law. Consequently, Title must defend.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary
judgment. The court held that the statute was a "doing business" law.
The court stated that- the statute is not distinguishable from a "doing
business" law merely because it is regulated by criminal penalties rather
than by conditions and restrictions. Title, therefore need not defend or
indemnify American.
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